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Abstract 
 This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, 
Auditing and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University. 
   
This study investigates whether family firms  are more aggressive in terms of 
tax planning than non-family firms in Greece, based on a sample of firms listed on the 
ASE(Athens Stock Exchange) from 2011-2016. It is examined also the effect of 
companies’ borrowing capacity on the level of tax aggressiveness. Also, I analyze the 
importance of tax aggressiveness in Greece which is a country with a high level of tax 
avoidance and also I summarize the literature on it focusing on the measurement, the 
decisive factors and the consequences of tax aggressiveness. In addition, I describe the 
agency theory in relation to tax avoidance and I examine the role of family ownership 
structure in tax aggressiveness. Using a sample of 81 Greek listed firms for the six-year 
period, 2011 to 2016, I find a significant relationship between classification as a family 
firm and tax aggressiveness, based on one metric, the effective tax rate which captures 
the actual taxes paid in relation to pre-tax earnings. The family firms in the sample 
were more tax aggressive than the non-family firms as ETR had a negative sign, 
identifying a tendency for family firms to pay lower taxes. On the other hand, 
regarding the second hypothesis, the coefficient of Coverage ratio is positive and this 
means that the borrowing capacity is negative associated with tax aggressiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate taxes represent a very important cost to all kind of businesses and 
their shareholders as government (federal, state, and local) takes a greater than one-
third share of a firm’s pre-tax profits. Consequently, undoubtedly, shareholders wish not 
to pay taxes and try to reduce them using different strategies. Therefore, shareholders 
as well as companies prefer tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, tax aggressiveness 
has a negative side as it provokes non-tax costs some of which are created by agency 
problems. 
In this paper, we examine the influence of the family nature of a company on the 
level of tax aggressiveness under certain circumstances in Greece. In order to research 
the relationship between family firms in Greece and tax aggressiveness, we will test the 
following hypothesis: Greek family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms. 
We study the implications of non-tax cost considerations arising from the unique agency 
conflict in family firms for their tax management activities (Chen, Chen, Cheng and 
Shevlin, 2010). According to them, tax aggressiveness is the “downward management of 
taxable income through tax planning activities.” These activities include both activities 
considered legal and illegal (as well as those in the inevitable gray area between the 
two). Corporate taxes, undoubtedly, represent a significant cost to businesses and their 
shareholders so actions to decline the tax burden are desirable. On the other hand, we 
are not able to assume that tax aggressive activities always lead to firm value 
maximization as there are potential costs related to methods to minimize taxes, such as 
implementation and transaction costs, possible penalties imposed by the tax authorities 
and reputation risks, that must be considered (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Hanlon & 
Slemrod, 2009). 
 We investigate also the relation between borrowing capacity and tax 
aggressiveness in Greek family firms estimated as a further hypothesis that coverage 
ratio is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. Prior studies assume that leverage 
and coverage, which are two solvency ratios and have to do with debt, are inversely 
related to ETR so they are positive connected with tax aggressiveness. 
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Earlier studies by Chen & Chu (2005),Crocker & Slemrod (2005) and Desai & 
Dharmapala (2006) established the bases for the relationship between tax 
aggressiveness and agency questions. Because of the fact that managers have the 
advantage to gather a lot of information on the extent of legally acceptable reductions 
of income taxes, they can also enhance the size of tax deductions through illegal 
measures that avoid taxes. Managers’ inducements to expanse the limits of tax rules 
depend on the nature of their compensation mechanisms and the potential personal 
penalties that may be imposed on them.  
In this study, we analyse particularly Greece for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
ownership of Greek listed firms is highly concentrated and more specifically family – 
controlled, while the ownership of the Anglo-Saxon (US, UK) listed firms is widely 
dispersed. According to La Porta, Lopez De Silanes, & Shleifer(1999), 65% of the 20 
largest Greek companies are dominated by a few families, while 30% are controlled by 
the government and the remaining 5% are widely dispersed. On the other hand, 80% of 
the 20 largest US companies as well as 90% of the 20 largest UK companies have no 
controlling shareholder. Moreover, Greece has one of the largest numbers of SMEs 
(Small and medium-sized enterprises) businesses within the EU and most of them are 
family businesses (Spyros Vassiliadis and Achilleas Vassiliadis / Procedia Economics and 
Finance 9 (2014) 242 – 247). So the Greek market is appropriate so as to be examined 
family firms where ownership and control are not separated on the level of tax 
aggressiveness. In addition, according to Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), the Greek 
economy has currently become more progressive and the financial system is less 
market-based than the E.E. average. Even though the difficult circumstances, for 2015, 
Greece is the 15th largest economy in the 28-member European Union. Greece is also 
the 46th largest economy in the world (World Bank, OECD, 2016). Furthermore, 
countries, like Greece, depends their macroeconomics and budgetary objectives on the 
decline of tax avoidance. We take into account the structure and function of the Greek 
tax system in accordance with the level of corporate tax rate. Many international 
institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) have detected tax avoidance in 
Greece. According to several studies, tax evasion in our country is substantially higher 
than in other developed countries. Bronchi C. (2001), characterizes the Greek tax system 
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as a complicated and non-transparent system, with a lack of strong tax imposition. It is 
also notorious for the corruption of state tax collectors and the complexity of Greek tax 
law. There is a huge debate about the stability and the competitiveness of corporate tax 
in Greece. In contrast to to other tax systems, taxes in Greece change regularly. In 2010 
the corporate tax was 24% and 20% for 2011 and 2012 while in 2013 a new tax law set 
the corporate tax law at 26%. As a result, this instability and all these unique 
characteristics of Greek tax system make this research in Greece worthy.  
This study and its expected outcomes contribute to the existing accounting and 
finance literature in Greece in several ways. First of all, although a few studies have 
been conducted concerning mainly US and UK data about the relation between 
corporate tax aggressiveness and family ownership, to our point of knowledge, there is 
no other study in Greece that examines this issue. Consequently, this fact will lead to 
the increase of knowledge regarding that issue and it will add to more new empirical 
evidence about this connection within a small European capital market such as Greece. 
Secondly, our evidence provides an essential step toward a better perceptive of the 
effect of firms’ ownership structures in Greece, illustrating whether agency conflicts 
directly influence companies’ tax aggressiveness. Thirdly, our research, focus ,except 
from the relation between family ownership and tax aggressiveness, on another 
important feature, borrowing capacity, which influences tax avoidance and it is not used 
in a wide extent in other studies. Lastly, the results of this survey could be useful for tax 
policymakers who seek to identify the companies in which the risk of corporate tax 
aggressiveness is higher.  
The rest of the project proceeds as follows. In the next chapter we review 
related literature and the hypothesis development. The research design is explained in 
the third section while the main results and the data analysis are reported in the fourth 
section. Finally, the fifth section completes the study.    
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this part, I summarize the published work on tax aggressiveness. I also 
examine the relation between agency theory and tax aggressiveness. Subsequently, I 
develop my main hypothesis making the connection between family firms and tax 
aggressiveness as well as my supplementary hypothesis between firms’ borrowing 
capacity and tax aggressiveness. 
2.1 Tax Aggressiveness 
 Tax aggressiveness has been examined by a number of researchers (Dunbar, 
Higgins, Phillips, & Plesko, 2010). In literature it is easy to find many words that try to 
represent with different words tax behaviour. Some of these terms are tax 
aggressiveness, tax avoidance, tax evasion, etc. As mentioned, Chen et al. (2010) define 
tax aggressiveness as the use of tax planning actions for downward management of 
taxable income. In turn, Frischmann, Shevlin and Wilson (2008) define it as engaging in 
important tax positions with relatively uncertain supporting facts. Another definition is 
given by Lisowsky, Robinson, Schmidt (2010), as a set of tax avoidance activities falling 
along a continuum from legal tax planning to offensive use of offshore tax shelters. 
Dyreng et al. 2008 argue that tax avoidance discloses all the dealing that have an impact 
on the company’s tax obligations. Specifically, they define tax avoidance as anything 
that declines the company’s effective tax rate for a reasonable period of time. According 
to Chen et al (2010), companies determine the level of tax aggressiveness putting at risk 
the benefits over the costs in order to manipulate taxes. The profits contain greater 
savings from taxes, while in contrast the expenses include those for implementation 
(time and effort, transaction costs), the possible penalties from the tax authorities as 
well as the possible reputation cost and decline in stock price in reaction to news of tax 
avoidance. Rego (2003) suggests that corporations which regularly present low tax 
payments have higher cash flows. There is a lack of revealing in the financial statements 
regarding taxable income and the exact amount paid or deferred to be paid in the 
annual profits (Hanlon M., Heitzman S., 2010). In addition, Hanlon & Slemrod (2009), 
analyzing the relation between stock prices and news of firms’ tax aggressiveness 
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(involvement in tax shelters), discover that on average the stock price diminishes when 
there is news about participation in tax shelters, but the reaction is small related to 
other infractions.  
 
2.1.1. Determinants of tax aggressiveness 
  
 Many papers study the connection between firm characteristics and tax 
aggressiveness. Gupta and Newberry (1997) propose that the effective tax rates are 
combined with the entity’s capital structure and assets. Stickney and McGee (1982) 
argue that size and foreign operations are less essential decisive factors than capital 
intensity, debt, and financing activities that create alterations in the effective tax rates. 
Rego (2003) supports that economies of scale exist for tax avoidance, which means that 
a company bigger in size should have higher effective tax rates than a smaller one and 
firms with higher profitability would have lower effective tax rates from companies with 
lower profits. Slemrod (2004) submits that the motives of the managers to involve tax 
evasion are influenced by the relationship between the shareholders of a company and 
the manager responsible for the company’s taxes and by the way the managers’ 
agreement will adjust as a reaction to the policies forced by the tax authorities. Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006) show a negative relationship between managers’ incentive 
compensation and tax aggressiveness measures. It is proved by them that higher 
incentives are related to lower levels of tax sheltering. Moreover, one crucial aspect that 
affects the phenomenon of tax aggressiveness is ownership structure. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) suggest that ownership structure can adjust as a response to 
problems that have to do with wider governance issues. 
 
2.1.2 The effects of tax aggressiveness 
 
The potential ramifications of tax aggressiveness can be various, both positive 
and negative. The most obvious advantage of avoiding paying taxes is the money 
entities save. As a result, high cash flows could be generated for the companies and 
consequently new investments could be made and firms’ value could be increased. 
Furthermore, these savings are advantageous for both shareholders and managers who 
can benefit from it since they are rewarded through bonuses that are connected with 
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the tax management of the firm. In reality, the managers’ reimbursements are 
motivations of tax avoidance practices in most cases. Undoubtedly, several studies have 
documented the links between tax aggressiveness and managers’ inducements looking 
from different prospects. For instance, Phillips (2003) found that rewarding managers 
based on after-tax results is combined with lower effective tax rate (ETRs). In the same 
way, Slemrod (2004) established a model for the link between tax aggressiveness and 
manager remuneration. More empirically, Rego and Wilson (2012) reported a positive 
relationship between tax aggressive planning and managers. Furthermore, Robinson, 
Sikes, and Weaver (2010) documented that firms with tax departments treated as profit 
centres pay fewer taxes. This means that tax managers are compensated for tax 
avoidance. On the other hand, a study by Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) proved 
no relationship between tax directors’ compensations and tax avoidance. The authors 
concluded that tax matters are affected more by the top management team than the 
tax administrator as an individual. These aforementioned studies demonstrate that 
managers are being reimbursed for tax planning based on the tax savings from the taxes 
evaded. However, it has been supported that the nature of the compensation contracts 
between the fund providers and professional managers seems insufficient. This 
approach of personal interest of managers in tax planning was further searched in Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006). The authors supported that managers having high motives tend 
to avert more taxes without resources' diversion in the better governed companies.    
Another potential gain from tax aggressiveness for the decision makers is rent 
seeking. Rent seeking deals with the maximization of activities which decision makers 
try to achieve at the cost of shareholders (Chen et al, 2010). Desai and Dharmapala 
(2004, 2006) also show the association between rent-seeking and tax avoidance. 
According to them, tax avoidance activities usually consist of very complex transactions 
that are designed to conceal the underlying intent and to prevent detection by the IRS. 
The obscure nature of such tax aggressiveness activities makes it easier for managers 
and family owners to disguise rent extraction activities. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) 
argue that the effect of tax aggressiveness depends on whether the corporation or the 
management is punished and the extent to which the firm can outweigh any 
punishment with the salary of the tax officer. 
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In addition, shareholders and managers are influenced by tax aggressiveness. If 
the corporation avoids taxes by investing in R & D, then implied taxes could have a 
negative effect on shareholders’ wealth (Berger, 1993). If stockholders request from the 
decision makers to have higher cash flows, then if managers have the suitable motive, 
they decide for the evasion of taxes. If managers use the best solution to avoid taxes 
and investors have a reasonable opinion about the degree and benefit from tax 
avoidance, then the inevitable consequence is that no relation is about to arise between 
tax avoidance and firm value (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). An additional disadvantage 
is the possible discount in the price that is imposed by other stockholders if they realize 
that decision makers use tax aggressiveness to distract rents (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006). Finally, the firm’s existence is influenced by the reputational risks of tax 
avoidance. According to Christensen and Murphy (2004), tax aggressiveness doubts the 
rightfulness of the corporation in the society. The public expects from a lawful 
corporation to be corporate responsible in ways that allow the firm to contribute to the 
prosperity of the society where it operates. 
Concluding, according to Annual et al (2014), while the firm and shareholders 
gain by tax aggressiveness in form of tax savings, the possible non-tax costs combined 
with, they may also be huge depending particularly on the structure of corporate 
ownership and control. These non-tax costs include loss of efficiency in internal control, 
agency costs of rent extraction, potential penalty, possible price discount and corruption 
to organizational legality. 
 
2.2. Agency Theory and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Various studies have empirically tested aspects of tax aggressiveness associated 
with questions involving agency conflict (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and 
Shevlin, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2004, 2006). Agency conflict is generally defined 
in line with the concept presented by Jensen & Meckling (1976), according to which the 
action that maximizes the utility of managers (agents) does not necessarily maximize the 
utility of stockholders (principals). Therefore, it is possible the decisions made by agents 
to be different than those considered perfect by the principals and as a consequence 
conflicts are caused between the two groups. Lanis & Richardson (2011) examine the 
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repercussion of the composition of the board of directors and tax aggressiveness and 
find that the involvement of a larger number of independent directors decreases the 
probability of aggressive tax planning. Chen et al. (2010) study the relationship between 
tax aggressiveness and agency conflicts present in family firms and non-family firms. 
Family firms are defined as those in which member of the establishing family continue 
to hold top and senior management positions, are members of the board of directors or 
hold appropriate stakes in the controlling block. The reason to deal with these two types 
of corporations separately is that according to the authors, the presence of members of 
the founding family in the ownership structure indicates a greater agency conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders and a lesser one between owners and 
managers in comparison to non-family firms. The nature and the intensity of agency 
conflicts can affect the level of tax aggressiveness.    
 
2.3. Family Firms and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
According to Bagnoli, Liu & Watts (2011), family firms are surprisingly frequent. 
Indeed, in Europe and Asia family firms are at least as common as non-family firms (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Chen et al. (2010) define family firms as those 
“where members of the founding family continue to hold positions in top management, 
are on the board, or are blockholders of the company.” They argue that the presence of 
the founding family leads to a different ownership structure than that in other 
companies. The typically larger equity holding of family owners provides greater gains 
from the savings obtained through tax avoidance actions, including transactions with 
related parties (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, family firms should have higher incentives 
for tax aggressiveness. However, the costs are also possibly higher for family owners, 
because of the greater loss from the decline of the stock price caused by negative 
perceptions of tax aggressiveness and their less diversified wealth (Chen et al., 2010).  
In addition, several literature mentions that family business affronts a reputation 
issue. Isakov and Weisskopf (2015) consider the decision making of a family firm will be 
influenced by the reputation they have as an asset and want to protect. Casson (1999) 
underlines that family owners have strong incentives to protect their family name, 
because they believe that  firms must be handed down to their descendants rather than  
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be wasted as a fortune on theirs lifetime. These strong connections and thoughts are 
making families more preoccupied with their reputation risk from being part of a tax 
evasion scandal and facing with accusations from the tax authorities. 
 Overall, although the advantages of tax aggressiveness are expected to be 
higher for family owners than for managers in non-family firms, the repercussions are 
likely higher too. Consequently, It is not obvious whether family firms will be more or 
less tax aggressive than non-family firms. Therefore, in order to study the relationship 
between family ownership and tax aggressiveness, I test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Greek family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms. 
 
 
2.4. Borrowing capacity and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
 According to previous studies, debt can influence a company’s level of tax 
aggressiveness. We express borrowing capacity by employing the financial expenses 
coverage ratio (Alexandros Sikalidis & Stergios Leventis , 2016). Coverage ratio is a 
solvency ratio that measures a company’s ability to cover its debt-related payments or 
in other words to meet its financial obligations. The evidence regarding the relationship 
between debt and tax avoidance is mixed. Existing literature (Rego and Wilson, 2012) on 
the one hand supports that corporations with high leverage or coverage ratios are 
associated with lower effective tax rates, which is consistent with higher tax avoidance. 
On the other hand, Wilson (2009) and Lisowsky (2010) provide evidence that tax shelter 
firms are connected with lower coverage ratios. Stickney and McGee (1982) also argue 
that Lev and Cov are positively correlated with tax avoidance. So, it is an empirical 
question whether firms with a higher coverage ratio are more or less tax aggressive. 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows in order to examine this relationship: 
Hypothesis 2 : Coverage ratio is inversely related to ETR so it is positively correlated with 
tax aggressiveness.  
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3. Methodology Research-Research Design 
In this section, I indicate the research method for this dissertation. It consists of 
the samples, the variables’ definitions and explanations for their choice. 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
The sample used in this dissertation consists of public companies listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 2011-2016. The initial sample that 
includes all non-financial companies which are listed in ASE through the period 2011-
2016 concludes 192 firms. In the developing of the final sample, we exclude companies 
from the Alternative Market and from the banking, insurance and brokerage sector, 
since their unique characteristics will not make them appropriate for comparison as well 
as companies with missing data that are necessary for the development of our variables. 
Also, as I examine mainly the variable family in comparison with tax aggressiveness, all 
companies of the initial sample which do not have family ownership are precluded from 
my final sample. Consequently, my final sample focuses on 81 non-financial family 
companies.  
Following prior research (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Mansi, and 
Reeb, 2003; Chen et al, 2010), family firms refer to those in which founders or their 
family members (by either blood or marriage) are key executives, directors, or 
blockholders. In order to identify family firms, we search for data regarding the voting 
rights which are available from the Athens Stock Exchange. Consistent with Faccio and 
Lang (2002), family ownership (FAM) is measured as the proportion of the company’s 
stocks directly or indirectly owned by a family, an individual or an unlisted firm. All the 
selected family firms are controlled by the largest shareholder who holds at least 10 
percentage of equity stakes or voting rights, in order to secure that a family controls the 
specific firm. 
 Financial information on all the necessary variables is collected from Amadeus 
Database. Furthermore, information regarding family ownership structure is collected 
from the ASE’s website (www.helex.gr). 
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3.2. Dependent Variable and Tax aggressiveness measure 
 In this study, the dependent variable is corporate tax aggressiveness. I will use a 
tax aggressiveness measure in order to triangulate my results. There is an excess of 
measures of corporate tax avoidance used in bibliography, such as the effective tax rate, 
cash effective tax rate, book tax difference measures, discretionary measures, 
unrecognized tax benefits etc. For my research, I use the Effective Tax Rate (ETRi,t) as a 
measurement of tax aggressiveness. This measure reflects aggressive tax planning 
through permanent book-tax differences and firms which are more tax aggressive have 
lower ETR than other firms (Chen et al, 2010). The effective tax rate is the average rate 
at which a company is taxed and demonstrates the average rate at which its pre-tax 
profits are taxed. According to IAS 12, Income Tax, it is calculated by dividing total 
income tax expense to the firm's pre-tax income. Particularly, total income tax expense 
is a sum of current tax and deferred tax. If two corporations also have the same pre-tax 
income but they are paying different taxes, this means that the company which pays 
less tax will be considered more effective in tax aggressiveness. 
 
3.3 Independent Variable 
 
 It is believed that certain ownership structures have an outcome on tax 
avoidance. Specifically, I investigate family ownership structure (Family) and it is 
calculated as the rate of stocks owned by the founding family to the total shares of the 
company. According to Bauweraerts (2013), in order characterize a corporation as a 
family firm, it needs to fulfil certain criteria. For our study the criteria will be firstly the 
proportion of company’s stocks directly or indirectly  owned by a family must be at least 
10% of equity stakes or voting rights and secondly the presence in the management of 
the firm. 
 
 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
 
 Previous studies have shown that control variables like the size of the company, 
profits, debt, capital intensity, growth opportunities and liquidity can affect the 
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company’s tax burden. COV, the coverage ratio, is a measure of a company's ability to 
meet its financial obligations to its lenders. More specifically, the interest coverage ratio 
is used to determine how easily a corporation can pay their interest expenses on 
outstanding debt and is defined as a company's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by interest expense. LEV, the leverage, is measured as long term debt to total 
assets. COV and LEV are two primary solvency ratios which are used to  evaluate the 
relative amount of debt in the company‘s capital structure and the adequacy of earnings 
and cash flow to cover interest expense and other fixed charges as they come due. ROA, 
the return on assets, is a ratio that shows the profitability of a company relatively to its 
total assets and is measured as operating income scaled by lagged assets (Chen et al, 
2010). Tian and Estrin (2008) underline that ROA is a better measurement of profitability 
than return on sales as the periodic outcomes of sales can be important for the results’ 
analysis. Another control variable is PPE, the plant, property and equipment scaled by 
lagged assets as capital intensive firms are affected more by the different treatments of 
depreciation expense for tax and financial reporting purposes (Chen et al, 2010). 
Furthermore, we include the variable INTANG, the intangible assets scaled by lagged 
assets to control for the differential book and tax treatments of intangible assets (Chen 
et al, 2010).Also, growth opportunities are measured by MB, the market-to-book ratio, 
which is calculated as market value of equity to book value of equity (Chen et al, 2010). 
SIZE is a proxy for firm size and is calculated either as the natural logarithm of a 
company’s total assets or the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Chen et 
al, 2010). For the purpose of our research, we calculate the size of each firm as market 
capitalization which is a synonym of market value of equity. Market capitalization is 
used to measure a company's size and helps investors diversify their investments across 
companies of different sizes and different levels of risk. Rego (2003) suggests that larger 
firms are more complicated in nature and are able to achieve economies of scale in tax 
avoidance to diminish their tax burden. CASH is the cash-to-asset ratio and is a proxy for 
free cash flow. The cash-to-asset ratio is used to measure a firm’s liquidity or its ability 
to pay its short-term obligations. We include BIG4 as dummy variable; 1 if the auditor is 
one of the big 4 companies and 0 otherwise. According to earlier studies (e.g. Chi et al. 
2011), Big 4 auditors are more likely to detect and record material errors and 
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inconsistencies in firms’ financial statements. In addition, lower audit quality is related 
with a greater level of “accounting flexibility”. Hence, a dummy variable, BIG4, is 
included in our survey to examine the effect of auditor quality in tax aggressiveness. 
Finally, dummies are involved to control for year fixed effects in corporate tax 
aggressiveness activities in Greece over the 2011–2016 financial years. The Year 
dummies are 1 if the year falls within a specific year, otherwise 0.  
 
3.5 Presentation of Models  
 To examine the association between the family ownership structure and tax 
aggressiveness, we used a regression following mainly the model of Chen et al (2010) in 
order to perform an analysis regarding various parameters included in our model. We 
estimate the following regression model : 
 
TaxAgg i t = αi + β1FAMILY i,t + β2ROA i,t + β3LEV i,t+ β4PPE i,t + β5INTANG i,t +  
 
β6CASH i,t + β7MB i,t-1 + β8SIZE i,t-1 + β9BIG4t + year dummies + ε i,t 
           (1) 
 
The subscripts i and t denote firms and year respectively; α is the constant term, 
β1 to β9 are slopes and ε is the disturbance term of the model ; TaxAgg is the tax 
aggressiveness measure as discussed above 
 
In addition, in order to analyze our second hypothesis and to test the effects of 
firms’ borrowing capacity on tax aggressiveness we are employing the following 
supplementary regression model : 
 
TaxAgg i t = αi + β1FAMILY i,t + β2COV + β3ROA i,t + β4LEV i,t+ β5PPE i,t + β6INTANG i,t +  
 
β7CASH i,t + β8MB i,t-1 + β9SIZE i,t-1 + β10BIG4t + year dummies + ε i,t 
           (2) 
 
We apply our linear regressions to panel data for the suitable presentation of our 
data. Panel data are using both time series and cross-sectional elements. So we will 
include information across both time and space. This is essential because panel data 
contain observations of multiple phenomena obtained over multiple time periods for 
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the same firms or individuals. Brooks (2014) inform us about several advantages that 
panel data provide us. Firstly, it is easier to analyze a broader range of issues and be 
able to deal with more complex problems rather than would be possible with time 
series or cross-sectional alone. Secondly, we would face problems if we need to examine 
how variables, or the relationships between them, change over time, using either series 
data or cross sectional data. By using pure time series data we would often require a 
long run of data nothing more than to get a sufficient number of observations to be able 
to handle significant hypothesis tests. So, combining cross-sectional and time series 
data, we can increase the number of degrees of freedom, and therefore the force of the 
test, by using information on the behavior of a large number of entities at the same 
time. The extra variation presented by combining the data in this way can also help to 
decrease loss from the problems of multicollinearity that may occurs if time series are 
utilized separately. Thirdly, by designing the model in a suitable way, we can eradicate 
the impact of certain forms of omitted variables bias in regression results. Taking 
everything into consideration, it is logical to decide to use panel data for 81 entities 
during a six year period from 2011 to 2016. The method we will use for the panel 
analysis is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 In this section, we present our findings of the empirical analysis (including 
descriptive statistics, Spearman correlations and regression results) and then we explain 
them. 
  
4.1 Empirical Analysis 
 
At the beginning of the empirical analysis, the descriptive statistics of our 
variables are presented below in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum St.Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
ETR 0.134764 0.090244 -38.01735 38.27907 3.240325 1.053070 109.6818
FAM 0.573490 0.607600 0.131650 0.956337 0.198877 -0.291232 1.959105
COV 5.457588 1.437789 -229.8000  177.2857  23.29719 2.097229 47.46183
ROA -0.024753 -0.019300 -0.359800 0.260400 0.074504 -0.918543 6.358850
LEV 0.201274 0.166124 -0.157485 1.265189 0.172971 1.740694 8.618617
PPE 0.426835 0.421546 0.006321 0.932462 0.194070 0.235885 2.472639
CASH 0.293611 0.117062 0.000285 4.175076 0.523800 4.142674 24.24244
INTANG 0.040733 0.007524 0.0000 0.692245 0.075887 3.318095 18.66414
MB 1.987216 0.370000 -5.720000 587.1300 26.75401 21.64869 473.7582
SIZE 90.80828 9.179000 0.0000 1767.433 269.9074 4.197296 21.05028
Dummy Variable
BIG4 0.138144 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.345408 2.097401 5.399093  
ETR, the effective tax rate; it is a tax aggressiveness measure as mentioned above; FAM, 
family ownership; COV, the coverage ratio, is measured as the EBITDA over interest paid; ROA, 
net income to total assets ratio; LEV, long-term debt to total assets ratio; PPE, the plant, 
property and equipment scaled by lagged assets; CASH, cash-to-asset ratio; INTANG, the 
intangible assets scaled by lagged assets; MB, market to book value ratio; SIZE, the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity; BIG4, dummy variable (1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 
auditors; 0 otherwise). 
  
Number of observations: 485; Period : 2011-2016 
 
The analysis of Table 1 indicates that the mean value of the dependent variable 
(ETR) is 0.134764 and the standard deviation is 3.240. Also, ETR ranges between -38.017 
and 38.279. The mean (standard deviation) of the independent variable FAM is 
0.57(0.20) as well as the mean (standard deviation) of COV is 5.46(23.30). Furthermore, 
the mean values (standard deviations) of control variables ROA, LEV, PPE, CASH, 
INTANG, MB, SIZE and the mean value (standard deviation) of the dummy BIG4 are -0.02 
(0.07), 0.20 (0.17), 0.43 (0.19),0.29 (0.52), 0.041 (0.076), 1.98 (26.75), 90.81 (269.90) 
and 0.14 (0.35) respectively. Finally, ROA ranges between -0.3598 and 0.2604, LEV 
ranges between -0.1574 and 1.265, PPE ranges between 0.006321 and 0.932, CASH 
ranges between 0.00029 and 4.175, INTANG ranges between 0.0000 and 0.69, MB 
ranges between -5.720 and 587.13 and SIZE ranges between 0.0000 and 1767.43. 
 
 
The next step of our empirical analysis includes the estimation of the correlation 
coefficients between the variables. Our findings are presented in the Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Correlations 
ETR FAM COV ROA LEV BIG4 PPE MB SIZE INTANG CASH
ETR 1.000000
FAM -0.005695 1.000000
COV 0.009273 0.196237 1.000000
ROA 0.011084 -0.026907 0.394243 1.000000
LEV 0.006688 0.082370 -0.128154 -0.038094 1.000000
BIG4 -0.063951  0.014415 0.110934 0.038788 0.039104 1.000000
PPE -0.031395 0.193356 -0.059396 -0.022616 0.278768 0.010031 1.000000
MB 0.018275 -0.022143 -0.008275 -0.058877 0.005586 -0.015291 -0.038490 1.000000
SIZE -0.080607 -0.261693 0.156193 0.343252 0.025146 0.304023 -0.043488 -0.009367 1.000000
INTANG -0.069992 -0.208857 -0.020747 -0.067026  0.023411  0.029216 -0.335992 -0.022576 0.117679 1.000000
CASH -0.021713 0.066671 0.373575  0.373184 -0.122902  0.076423 -0.013750 -0.019773 0.354638 -0.065844 1.000000  
 
ETR, the effective tax rate; it is a tax aggressiveness measure as mentioned above; FAM, 
family ownership; COV, the coverage ratio, is measured as the EBITDA over interest paid; ROA, 
net income to total assets ratio; LEV, long-term debt to total assets ratio; PPE, the plant, 
property and equipment scaled by lagged assets; CASH, cash-to-asset ratio; INTANG, the 
intangible assets scaled by lagged assets; MB, market to book value ratio; SIZE, the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity; BIG4, dummy variable; 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficient between the variables in the model. 
The correlation is according to Spearman’s correlation coefficient. An examination of 
table 2 shows a negative connection between FAMILY and ETR. Specifically, the 
correlation coefficient between the variables FAM and ETR is equal to -0.005695. 
Therefore, a positive (negative) alteration of one variable by one unit will cause a 
negative (positive) alteration of the other variable by 0.005 units. In addition, the 
correlation coefficient between ETR and COV is equal to 0.009273 which shows a 
positive relationship between these two variables. An increase (decrease) of one 
variable by one unit will cause a rise (decline) of the other by 0.0092 units. Also, FAM 
and COV are positively related since their correlation coefficient is equal to 0.196237. 
Hence, a positive (negative) alteration of one variable by one unit will cause a positive 
(negative) alteration of the other variable by 0.20 units. Moreover, ETR is negative 
associated with the control variables BIG4, CASH, INTANG, PPE and SIZE. On the other 
hand, the dependent variable ETR is positive correlated with LEV, MB and ROA.     
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The third stage of our empirical analysis presents the results of the regressions. 
First, model (1), in which ETR is the dependent variable and FAM is the explanatory 
variable (as well as the rest of the variables mentioned in section three), is estimated. 
The coefficients are estimated with the ordinary least squares method (OLS) as 
demonstrated in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: OLS Regression Results (1) 
Dependent Variable : ETR         
Method : Panel Least Squares       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-Statistic(p-
value) Prob 
 FAM  -4.575969 2.117442 -2.161083** 0.0313 
 ROA  0.877421 1.458544 0.601573** 0.0478 
 LEV  0.116865 0.736131 0.158756 0.8739 
 PPE  4.173738 2.915402 1.431617 0.1530 
 CASH  -0.132205 0.325104 -0.406656 0.6845 
 INTANG  0.052650 4.347152 0.012111 0.9903 
 MB   0.004582 0.000672 6.817789*** 0.0000 
 SIZE  0.002952 0.002498 1.181671 0.2381 
 BIG4  0.363500 0.053239 6.827727*** 0.0000 
 C  0.851721 1.815534 0.469130 0.6392 
 Year Dummies  Yes 
R-squared 0.210323     Mean dependent var 0.134764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027472     S.D. dependent var 3.240325 
S.E. of regression 3.195506     Akaike info criterion 5.330410 
Sum squared resid 4013.025     Schwarz criterion 6.124104 
Log likelihood -1200.624     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.642258 
F-statistic 1.150242     Durbin-Watson stat 2.873709 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.185064       
 
Number of observations: 485; Period : 2011-2016; FAM, family ownership; ROA, net 
income to total assets ratio; LEV, long-term debt to total assets ratio; PPE, the plant, property 
and equipment scaled by lagged assets; CASH, cash-to-asset ratio; INTANG, the intangible assets 
scaled by lagged assets; MB, market to book value ratio; SIZE, the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity; BIG4, dummy variable; year dummies 
 
***, **, * Indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively 
 
As we can notice from the table above variable FAMILY has coefficient -4.575969 
and probability of 0.0313. Consequently, the coefficient of the independent variable 
FAM is statistically significant at the 5% level since the p-value of its coefficient is less 
than 0.05. In addition, we can conclude that as the Family variable is statistically 
significant, the characteristic of being a family firm has a relationship with tax 
aggressiveness. A positive coefficient when using the dependent variable ETR will show 
that family firms are less aggressive because it will indicate they pay a higher effective 
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tax rate in relation to non-family firms, while a negative coefficient with the same 
dependent variable will show they are more aggressive as they pay a lower effective tax 
rate. The negative sign of the coefficient shows that family firms tend to practice more 
aggressive tax planning than non-family firms according to the ETR indicator. Also, 
according to Chen et al (2010), firms which are more tax aggressive have lower ETR than 
other firms. In our research, the coefficient of FAM is negative, as we said above, and as 
a result it is expected that this variable will have a negative impact on the dependent 
variable of the model. Thus, an increase (decrease) of this variable (FAM) will cause a 
decrease (increase) to the depended variable ETR. Moreover, as the ETR increases 
(declines), tax aggressiveness of the firm declines (increases) accordingly. Furthermore, 
it is observed that the coefficient of the control variable ROA is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level as the p-value(0.0478) of its coefficient is less than 0.05 and 
therefore, it is expected a positive relationship between these variables (ROA, ETR). As a 
consequence, as ETR increases, firms become less tax aggressive with the increase of 
the independent variable ROA. In addition, the coefficients of the control variables MB 
and BIG4 are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level and thus we can 
underline a positive relationship between these variables (MB, ETR) & (BIG4, ETR). 
Consequently, tax aggressiveness decreases with the increase of market to book value 
ratio and with an increase in a Big 4 auditor engagement. We also notice that the 
coefficients of the independent control variables CASH, INTANG, LEV, PPE and SIZE are 
not statistically significant at the 5% level and as a consequence a possible change of 
their values will not cause any effect on the dependent variable ETR. At this point, it is 
worth mentioning that if we exclude these variables from the model (since they are not 
statistically significant) and re-estimate the coefficients of the remaining variables, the 
latter will not be statistically significant at the 5% level. We can assume that there is an 
interior relationship between all the variables which provides a path for further 
research. Finally, we can observe from our regression analysis that R-squared (R2) is 
0.210323(21%) and its explanation will be presented in the next part. 
 
The final step of our empirical analysis includes the estimation of the coefficients 
of model (2) which includes additionally the variable COV. Again, the coefficients of the 
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model were estimated with the ordinary least squares method (OLS) and the results are 
presented in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: OLS Regression Results (2) 
Dependent Variable : ETR
Method : Panel Least Squares
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic(p-value) Prob
FAM -4.577269 2.116921 -2.162229** 0.0312
COV 0.869002 0.003436 0.252869*** 0.0005
ROA 0.821575 1.528541 0.537490* 0.0812
LEV 0.113561 0.735070 0.154491 0.8773
BIG4 0.364104 0.054401 6.692936*** 0.0000
PPE 4.181473 2.911867 1.436011 0.1518
MB 0.004580 0.000668 6.856622*** 0.0000
SIZE 0.002938 0.002540 1.156499 0.2482
INTANG -0.029048 4.466410 -0.006504 0.9948
CASH -0.125639 0.348806 -0.360196 0.7189
C 0.846394 1.805739 0.468724 0.6395
Year Dummies
R-squared 0.210334     Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared 0.025004     S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression 3.199558     Akaike info criterion
Sum squared resid 4012.971     Schwarz criterion
Log likelihood -1200.621     Hannan-Quinn criter.
F-statistic 1.134916     Durbin-Watson stat
Prob(F-statistic) 0.207422
5.649758
2.873452
Yes
0.134764
3.240325
5.334521
6.136842
 
 
FAM, family ownership; COV, coverage ratio; ROA, net income to total assets ratio; LEV, 
long-term debt to total assets ratio; PPE, the plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged 
assets; CASH, cash-to-asset ratio; INTANG, the intangible assets scaled by lagged assets; MB, 
market to book value ratio; SIZE, the natural logarithm of the market value of equity; BIG4, 
dummy variable; year dummies 
 
***, **, * Indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
 
 Table 4 indicates that the coefficient of the explanatory variable FAM is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5% level, which leads us to consider that the 
relationship between FAM and ETR is negative. This fact justifies the results of the first 
regression. Furthermore, according to the findings of the second regression we can 
deduct that the coefficients of the independent variable COV is positive and statistically 
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significant at the 1% level since the p-value of its coefficient is 0.0005 and as a result we 
expect that this variable will have a positive impact on the dependent variable ETR. 
More accurately, a positive (negative) alteration of its value will cause a positive 
(negative) alteration of the dependent variable ETR and consequently an effect on tax 
aggressiveness. In addition, table 4 shows that the coefficient of the control variable 
ROA is statistically significant at the 10% level while the coefficients of BIG4 and MB are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, the coefficient of the three control 
variable is positive and this means that an increase (decrease) of the variable will cause 
a rise (decline) of the dependent variable’s value. Finally, according to the results of the 
second model, LEV, PPE, SIZE, INTANG and CASH are not statistically significant at the 
5% level. Hence, a change of these variables will not cause a statistically significant 
change of the dependent variable. However, it should be underlined that these variables 
are not excluded from the model (although they are not statistically significant) because 
we assume that there is an endogenous relationship between all the variables, as 
mentioned previously. Lastly, it is underlined in our second regression model that R-
squared (R2) is 0.210334(21%), a number very close to R-squared of the first regression. 
4.2 Analysis of Results  
 
 The empirical analysis of Table 1 shows that the mean value of the FAM variable 
is 0.57 which indicates that 57% of a random Greek listed firm is expected to belong to a 
family.  With the ETR average at 13% as we said above this means that the average is 
smaller in contrast with the average corporate tax rate (24.44 %) during this period. As a 
consequence, in average Greek listed companies pay less than the average rate. In 
addition, we notice from our sample that some companies have ETR=0 or a price very 
close to zero. This means that either these companies have experienced managers and 
consultants who are experts in tax avoidance techniques or that these firms avoid taxes. 
In addition, the mean of BIG4 is equal to 0.14, indicating that a percentage of 14% of 
Greek listed firms are audited by a Big 4 company. So, the aforementioned data reflect 
the controlling existence of family ownership, suggesting that the vast majority of listed 
firms in Greece have family investors.  
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The examination of Table 2 illustrates that there are some particularly important 
correlations between the variables. Specifically, the correlation coefficient between the 
independent variable FAM and the dependent variable ETR is -0.005695, suggesting that 
an 1% increase in a firm’s family ownership will cause an -0.0057 decrease in the 
Effective Tax rate which means that tax aggressiveness increases. As a consequence, this 
indicates that firms with family ownership are more tax aggressive while they pay less 
Effective Tax Rate. A positive correlation COV and ETR (0.009) shows that as the firm’s 
ability to repay its financial obligations increases by 1%, the Effective Tax Rate rises by 
0.009% and simultaneously tax aggressiveness decreases. This illustrates that firms 
which have a higher coverage ratio, namely a better borrowing capacity, are less tax 
aggressive. Moreover, FAM is positively correlated with COV variable with a correlation 
coefficient (0.196237) which suggests that a 1% increase in a firm’s family ownership 
could cause a 0.20% increase in the borrowing capacity of companies. The sign of the 
correlation between effective tax rate and the independent variables generally follows 
our regressions’ results. Last but not least, we could mention that as the correlation 
coefficients are, generally, below the 0.9 threshold, there are no severe statistical 
problems regarding multicollinearity. 
  
 Table 3 points out the results from the regression model of tax aggressiveness 
with independent and control variables. As we can notice from the table variable 
FAMILY has coefficient -4.575969 and probability of 0.0313. So the coefficient of the 
independent variable FAM is negative and statistically significant. More accurately, this 
fact indicates that the higher family ownership in a firm, the lower the ETR and 
consequently the higher the magnitude of firms’ tax aggressiveness. Consistent with our 
family entrenchment effect hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), the findings of some given prior 
studies are confirmed. However, our results are contradictory with that found by Chen 
et al. (2010) for American firms according to which family firms exhibit lower tax 
aggressiveness. We can suggest two possible explanations for this. Firstly, in Greece 
taking an aggressive attitude towards taxes is not viewed by the public in such an 
adverse light as in the United States, given the much higher rate of tax avoidance by 
companies and people in general, particularly because of the large informal economy, 
which is favorable for underreporting of income. This at least mitigates the fear of the 
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negative effects on stock prices because of news about aggressive tax planning. The 
other possible explanation is the fact that many other taxes at the federal, state and 
municipal level that weigh heavily on firms’ results are not captured by the measure of 
tax aggressiveness applied here (ETR). Moreover, the coefficient of ROA variable is 
positive and statistically significant and as a result, it is concluded that the higher the 
profitability of a Greek listed firm the higher the level of Effective Tax Rate and the 
lower the tax aggressiveness. In addition, the coefficients of MB and BIG4 are positive 
and consequently the higher the growth of a firm and the engagement of the four 
largest audit companies, the higher the dependent variable ETR and the lower the tax 
aggressiveness. Furthermore, it is observed that the coefficients of LEV, PPE, INTANG, 
CASH and SIZE are not statistically significant indicating that the level of leverage, the 
tangible and intangible assets, the level of liquidity and the size of a firm do not affect 
the magnitude of tax aggressiveness according to our research. Finally, as we said above 
R-squared has a value of 0.210323 and this means that our basic model (1) explains 21% 
of the variability of the response data around its mean. R-squared indicates the 
percentage, which is 21% in our research, of the variance in the dependent variable (tax 
aggressiveness) that the independent variables explain collectively. In general, the 
higher the R-squared, the better the model fits our data. 
  
  Table 4 demonstrates the results of the second model (2) which examines 
additionally our second hypothesis and the relation between COV and ETR. As we can 
observe from the table, the coefficient of variable FAM is like the model (1) negative and 
statistically significant at 5%. More specifically, it is found again a significant negative 
relationship between the two variables (FAM and ETR). Moreover, COV has coefficient 
0.869002 and probability 0.0005. As a consequence the coefficient of COV is positive 
and statistically significant. Particularly, this fact points out that the higher the coverage 
ratio, namely a company’s ability to cover its debt-related payments, the higher the 
Effective Tax Rate that the company pays and consequently the lower the tax 
aggressiveness. These results are inconsistent with our coverage hypothesis (Hypothesis 
2) and the findings of Rego and Wilson (2012) and Stickney and McGee (1982) which 
assume a positive relation between the coverage ratio and the tax aggressiveness. 
However, our outcomes corroborates the findings of some other prior studies such as 
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Wilson (2009) and Lisowsky (2010)  which support an opposite relation between tax 
aggressive firms and coverage ratios. Also, the coefficients of the control variables, ROA, 
BIG4 and MB are also positive and statistically significant which could be interpreted just 
like in model (1). More specifically, it is found again a significant positive relationship 
between ROA and ETR, BIG4 and ETR and MB and ETR. Consequently, as in model (1), as 
the profitability of a Greek listed firm rises, the level of Effective Tax Rate increases and 
the tax aggressiveness declines. In addition, the engagement of a Big 4 auditor has a 
positive effect on ETR which indicates that an increase in a Big 4 auditor engagement 
increases the level of ETR and diminishes the level of tax aggressiveness. Also, the higher 
the growth of a firm(MB), the higher the ETR and subsequently the lower the tax 
aggressiveness. In conclusion, R-squared of the second model is 0.210334(21%) and this 
means that, like the first regression, R2 explains 21% of the variability of the response 
data around its mean. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of family ownership structure on 
tax aggressiveness in Greece. As an additional intent we studied the influence of 
companies’ borrowing capacity in the level of how tax aggressive they are. Through this 
study, we tried to investigate the range of tax aggressiveness, from the determinants to 
the consequences that the phenomenon is characterized. We analysed the tax 
aggressiveness of family firms, relative to their non-family counterparts. For this 
purpose we selected a sample of 81 Greek listed firms for a six-year period, 2011 to 
2016 (485 observations). We used one tax rate measure to capture tax aggressiveness 
and different proxies for founding family presence to triangulate our results. The 
empirical findings indicate that the family ownership structure of these companies have 
an impact on the level of tax aggressiveness that firms exhibit. By focusing also on the 
impact of firms’ borrowing capacity on tax aggressiveness, we examine the conditions 
under which firms try to deviate from tax laws. 
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 Extant literature states two opposing views on the effects of family ownership 
structure on corporate tax aggressiveness. The first argues that family firms could 
exhibit a higher level of tax avoidance. On the other hand, the second view argues that 
controlling families could inhibit tax aggressiveness. Specifically, our research shows that 
Greek family firms are more tax aggressive than non-family firms. This result is 
consistent with some given prior studies’ results that family firms would expose a higher 
level of tax aggressiveness as family owners will benefit more from tax savings. 
However, our findings are contrary to the results of Chen et al (2010) which show that 
family firms exhibit lower tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, our findings also reveal that 
firms are less tax aggressive as the ETR is higher when a firm’s profitability is high as well 
as when a company’s market-to-book ratio is high or when there is an engagement of a 
Big 4 auditor. Finally, the rest of the control variables are not statistically significant and 
as a result they do not affect the dependent variable. 
 
 Regarding our supplementary hypothesis between tax aggressiveness and 
coverage ratio, we concluded that as the firm’s ability to fulfil its obligations towards its 
lenders increases, Effective Tax Rate also rises and consequently tax aggressiveness 
declines while there is a positive relation between COV and ETR.   
 
 The findings of this study could contribute to the existing literature by concluding 
that, on average, family ownership exacerbates tax aggressiveness as it provokes an 
increase on it. Moreover, the results may be relevant for countries with highly family 
concentrated ownership similar to that of Greece. This dissertation adds to the 
continuous debate about tax avoidance and the reason that create the phenomenon. 
Particularly, the new regulations about double taxation and the arrival of Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) in the following years make the research of taxation issues 
demanding. According to OECD, BEPS is a framework that refers to “tax avoidance 
measures that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low 
or no-tax locations”. It consists of 100 countries and jurisdictions. Furthermore, in June 
2015, OECD proposed its Action Plan involving 15 different actions and in January 2016, 
the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package was released by the European Union. This Package 
contained strict measures to inhibit aggressive tax planning, boost tax transparency and 
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establish equal conditions for all businesses in the EU. It will be quite appealing for 
future researchers to analyse the results of these actions in the near future. Shackelford 
and Shevlin (2001) suggest a continuous inspection on the determinants of tax 
avoidance and Weisbach (2002) inquires why there are not more legal ways to protect 
investors from taxes. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) request a greater extend of 
investigation in the factors that examines the ways taxes are avoided. Labelle et al 
(2014), wonder if business ethics is the ‘‘Last Rampart’’, the last defence against tax 
aggressiveness. In the same way, Lanis and Richardson (2012, 2013) agree that we need 
to check thoroughly the participation of business ethics in leading corporate tax policy. 
 
 However, this research is subject to several limitations. First, similar to other 
studies, our sample refers to firms in a single country. Second, a limitation of this 
research is the relatively small sample size. Because of the global financial crisis of the 
last eight years, many companies are either delisted within the six-year period we 
examine (2011-2016) or their shares trading is under temporary suspension. 
Furthermore, companies whose share trading is under surveillance are excluded. Third, 
our models consist of control variables most of which are included in a large number of 
similar studies. Nevertheless, there are probably more alternatives which would be 
worth investigating as they could control for the impact of more or completely different 
aspects of family ownership structure and tax aggressiveness. Additionally, another 
limitation could be the fact that tax aggressiveness is measured in our survey with one 
measure (ETR) while additional measures like book-tax difference could be utilized to 
capture it. The results and limitations provide avenues for further research. Future 
studies could conduct research testing more years and probably using a larger sample 
size. The investigation of family ownership and tax aggressiveness could be extended to 
include samples from other European or international domains. Finally, future research 
should take into account several other categories of ownership structure (such as 
institutional ownership), while the family ownership could be measured considering  the 
number of generations and individuals of family members who are included in family 
business in order to evaluate the depth and width of dedication of these members 
(Astrachan et al. 2002). 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
TAXAGG Dependent variable-Tax aggressiveness measure
FAMILY
Independent variable. Family ownership which is 
measured as the proportion of company’s stocks 
directly or indirectly owned by a family, an 
individual or an unlisted firm that possesses at 
least 10 percent of equity stakes or voting rights.
ROAi,t
Control variable. Return on assets for firm i, year 
t, measured as operating income scaled by total 
assets.
LEVi,t
Control variable. Leverage for firm i, year t, 
measured as long-term debt scaled by total 
assets.
PPEi,t
Control variable. Property,plant and equipment for 
firm i, year t, scaled by lagged assets.
INTANGi,t
Control variable. Intangible assets for firm i, year 
t scaled by lagged assets.
SIZEi,t-1
Control variable. Natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity for firm i, at the beginning of year 
t
MBi,t-1
Control variable. Market-to-book ratio for firm i, 
at the beginning of year t, measured as market 
value of equity scaled by book value of equity
CASH
Control variable. Cash and cash equivalents over 
current liabilities
BIG4 Control variable.Dummy variable: 1 if the auditor 
is one of the big 4 companies and 0 otherwise.
D2012
D2016
COV
The coverage ratio is measured as the EBITDA 
over interest paid
Year Dummies to control for year fixes effects in 
corporate tax aggressiveness in Greece. They are 
1  if the year falls within a specific year, 
otherwise 0. 
 
 
 
